Philosophy 1 Research Paper The Arguments From Design As an atheist, I naturally find my beliefs questioned a lot by theists. Usually when a theist is trying to convince me that a God exists, they tend to use arguments from design. Such as "Don't you think that a world like this had to have been made by some all powerful being?" Or Surely you think that a world filled with so much complicated phenomena had to have been designed by someone My favorite "Did you know that the earth is EXACTLY the right distance away from the sun and that donıt you think that had to be articulated by someone." So I chose to write a small paper on some of the most common flavors of the design argument that I have heard, including refutations. All that I want to demonstrate is that most of the variations of the arguments from design are very flawed and sometimes outright illogical. I do not intend to show God doesnıt exist. I do not even intend to argue his existence one way or the other. All that I want to show is that many of these design arguments, although neat like all argument for God, are very bad ones that contain too many holes. We will start with the more formal versions and work our way down to the ones that are less formal. So to begin, we will start with a variation that is treated by David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion1: Both artifacts and natural objects display orderly adjustment of constituent parts to each other. 2. Artifacts have this property as a result of being designed. 3. Of two classes of things, x and y, if the members of x and y share some property p1, and members of x have p1 as a result of having a property p2, then, probably, members of y have p1 as a result of having p2. 4. Therefore, natural objects display orderly adjustment of constituent parts to each other as a result of being designed. (Natural objects are designed.) 5. If natural objects are designed, then some god designed them. 6. If some god designed natural objects, then God designed them. 7. If God designed natural objects, then God exists. 8. Therefore, God exists. The meat or crux of this argument is in the first three premises. The language used for the rest of the argument is in the first premise, so that will be what we try to clarify for now. We first must know exactly what orderly and adjustment mean. For example, a theist could take orderly to mean arranged by an intelligent designer. If this were allowed, the theist would be simply assuming to be true exactly what it is he is supposed to be proving. Similarly, if one were to take adjustment to mean "relation caused to obtain by an intelligent designer, then one would be assuming the point he is trying to show with this argument. That is, if those are the definitions chosen for such words, then the person must demonstrate things like The universe does in fact exhibit order instead of making them assumptions since the goal here is to show there is in fact a intelligent designer. Another bad example of what to take as a definition of orderly could be arranged in the accordance of a law or rule since this would mean we are assuming a lawgiver who is what we are trying to find. Examples of suitable definitions may be not random for orderly, which may be fine if we keep in mind that randomness depends on what we expect to find given our knowledge about something we want to investigate. Regardless of how vague natural object may be, the word will be left to mean all non-human made objects for this paper since I see no other way of defining it. The word artifact will also be taken to mean human-made object. It should be noted that arguments, which sound a little, more like: Everything in the universe that has the property of having parts displaying orderly adjustment of constituent parts (hereafter "order") and which is such that we know whether or not it was designed was, in fact, designed. 2. Living things display order. 3. Therefore, living things were probably designed. from Alvin Plantinga's God and Other Minds1 , can still be treated as the previous argument. The reason this is so is because on closer examination of premise 1, it looks remarkably similar to premise 3. So one can see that the objections we will have for the previous argument later can also apply to arguments that sound a little more like the second one found in Platingaıs work. One should also keep in mind the attention we gave previously to words like adjustment. I am very unsure as to from where this next argument originated from1: It is extremely implausible that living things could have come to exist by mere chance. 2. Living things exist. 3. Therefore, probably, living things did not come to exist by mere chance. 4. If living things did not come to exist by mere chance, then living things were designed. 5. Therefore, living things were designed. This argument essentially states in premise four that living things originated by either being designed or by chance. That was the last of the very formal versions we will look at. From this point on, we will be looking at more wordy versions of the arguments for God concerning design. The first of these we will look at will be the teleological argument from Thomas Aquinası Summa Theologica2: We see that things, which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtains the best result. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end not by chance, but by design. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it is directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the archer directs the arrow. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God. We can understand Aquinası terminology act for an end to mean given the same circumstances, they will always act in the same way. He uses the metaphysics of Aristotle when he explains things in terms of their ends (the final causation). He differs with Aristotle in that Aquinas attributes the naturalness of things (such as an acorn growing into an oak tree) to a god and not it just being a fact of nature. William Paley popularized this next argument which was developed as an extension to Aquinası argument, the main difference is that this one argues by analogy, hence the name the Analogical Argument3. The argument starts of by asking how one would determine the origin of a watch they found on the ground: when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g., that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would would have answered the use that is now served by it. the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers, who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use. Paley furthers his argument by analogy. every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation. Most theists will use examples such as the human eye to support evidence of design. The eye is immensely complex, and each of its many components must function in unison with the other components of the eye in order to produce vision. With the intrinsic adjustment of parts we have the means of the end result vision, a theist might argue. Now that we have seen a few variations of this argument, we can go back to the beginning and start looking at objections. It may be fine to grant the first two premises of this argument if we take special care to the definitions of certain words as discussed above, but serious problems arise when we take premise three: Of two classes of things, x and y, if the members of x and y share some property p1, and members of x have p1 as a result of having a property p2, then, probably, members of y have p1 as a result of having p2.î The reason such problems arise can be seen if we looked at a clear counterexample1: Working light bulbs band stars both have the property of emitting light. 2. Working light bulbs have this property as a result of being powered by electricity. 3. [Same as for the design argument.] 4. Therefore, stars have the property of emitting light as a result of being powered by electricity. As you can see, the problem arises from the keyword in the premise probably. This premise is based on gross overgeneralizations. As such, it can only be used to verify overgeneralizations, some of which being false. Another example could show this: 1. Supernatural things and natural things exist. 2. Natural things have this property as the result of being created. 3. [Same as for the design argument.] 4. Therefore, Supernatural things probably have the property of existence as a result of being brought into existence. We are using the classes of all things natural and all things supernatural to constitute as x and y, p1 is existence, and p2 is being created or being brought into existence. Supernatural things can be shown to exist simply by taking any examples of things that can not be explained currently by the natural laws we have. If we were to accept the proof from a theist that natural things exist because they were created, we have premise two of this example. Premise three and four follow exactly as they do in the design argument that we are examining. So there is absolutely nothing in the reasoning of the design argument, particularly premise three, which stops us from warranting the conclusion reached in the above example. The significance of the example is that the conclusion is one that a monotheist would object too since God is a member of the class of things that are supernatural. In any case, the gods go on ad infinitum. So we see now clearly that the problem with the premise is that it opens the door to ridiculous unwarranted overgeneralizations. There have been alternatives to the premise proposed, one of which goes like this1: ì3'. Of two classes of things, x and y, if the members of x and y share some property p1, and members of x have p1 as a result of having a property p2, and p2 is the only way known of producing p1, then, probably, members of y have p1 as a result of having p2.î This is still not a complete solution for this version of the design argument. In order for it to solve the problem, it must be shown that intelligent design is the only way of producing parts that work together or constituent parts. The reason this is a problem is because many scientists would have a hard time buying these (even theistic scientists). They can simply point to things like stars and other such heavenly bodies that are created naturally and by things that have no conscious foresight, and hence no way of designing something with a purpose in mind. We do not need to spend anywhere near the same amount of time on the argument that followed directly after the one previously discussed because it has so many of the same instances. For example, when we inspect premise 1: Everything in the universe that has the property of having parts displaying orderly adjustment of constituent parts (hereafter "order") and which is such that we know whether or not it was designed was, in fact, designed. It claims that everything that displays order in the universe must be designed. All it takes is the submission of a single counterexample, a snowflake for instance, and that claim is immediately shown to be false due to snowflakes having order or constituent parts from its micro-properties of ice crystals and not of any design. Examples could also include the ones mentioned in the previous argument (stars and heavenly bodies). The theme with the next argument is chance. It argues that life could not be the product of mere chance. The first objection to this argument starts right from the beginning with premise 1: It is extremely implausible that living things could have come to exist by mere chance. The argument starts right away saying it is hard to imagine that life started by mere chance. The problem here is simply that the arguments starts with this premise, it doesnıt have any preceding premises to support this statement. People who imagine otherwise can just stop reading the proceeding premises if they want. Granting premise two and the vacuous at best premise three (too similar to premise one, which didnıt have any support to begin with), we take a look at premise four: If living things did not come to exist by mere chance, then living things were designed. This premise is has plenty of reason to be objected because it is offering a false choice. It is assuming (has no support) that the universe could have been caused. There are people, for example, who believe the universe has always existed and require no causal explanation of the world. So it is giving a false choice in that it is only giving you the choice between mere chance and being created or designed. Another possibility could be a scientific one. For example, instead of mere chance, say it took the universe billions and billions of years of synthesizing processes to develop just the proteins needed for DNA and then more synthesizing processes on top of that to get molecular compounds for supporting life. It should be noted that there are some outspoken people, Creationists and Evolutionists, who severely dispute the previous objection every day. Moving onto the ever popular, and probably originator of the design argument, Thomas Aquinas. In giving the most warranted objection to Mr. Aquinas, I can do no better than to quote Atheism: The Case Against God by George Smith3: and its fundamental error-lies in the assumption that order presupposes conscious design (where order refers to the regularity in nature). This is demonstrably false. It is true that order exists in the universe, that there is a regularity in nature, that entities will behave in the same way under the same circumstances-but it is not valid to infer from this the existence of any master designer. On the contrary, order is simply the manifestation of causality, and causality is a derivative, a logical corollary, of the Law of Identity. To exist is to exist as something, and to be something is to possess specific, determinate characteristics. In other words, every existing thing has identity: it is what it is and not something else. To say that something has determinant characteristics is to say that something has a limited nature, and these limits necessarily restrict its range of possible actions. The nature of an entity determines what it can do in a given set of circumstances. In An Introduction to Logic, H. W. B. Joseph writes: to say the same thing acting on the same thing under the same conditions may yet produce a different effect, is to say that a thing need not be what it is. But this is in flat conflict with the Law of Identity. A thing, to be at all, must be something and can only be what it is. To assert a causal connection between ëa and ëx implies ëa acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is ëa. So long therefore as it is ëa, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is ëa is something else than the ëa which it is declared to be. It is a mistake to confuse order with design. If there is a design in nature, there must be a designer, but the same is not true of order. Order does not presuppose an orderer; it is simply entailed by the nature of the existence itself. Once we accept the fact of existence, we must also accept the fact that things are what they are (identity), and that they behave as they do, in virtue of what they are (causality). The theistıs choice between choice and design is a false alternative. Because the order of nature is not a result of planning, it does not follow that it is the consequence of mere chance. Metaphysically speaking, there is no such thing as chance. Occurrences do not ìjust happen inexplicably, without causes. We speak of chance when we are unaware of all relevant factors, such as when we say the result of a coin toss is a matter of chance. But this simply means that, within one ís context of knowledge, the outcome of the toss is unknown. Nevertheless causal conditions are at work, and if we were armed with the necessary knowledge-such as the velocity, height, and angle of the toss-a predictions of the result would be possible. The concept of chance is epistemological, not metaphysical. So what Smith is saying supports what was said for a previous argument in that chance is pertaining to what we consider knowledge and not pertaining to what we consider reality. So the concept of chance is almost meaningless when we are discussing things pertaining to reality, like what does and does not constitute design or order in reality. Smith tells us that the main error in this argument is that order is being substituted with design freely. This is something we also touched on in the first version of the design argument when we tried to distinguish what definitions of order are relevant. When Smith talks about the Law of Identity, this accounts for order in that there can be nothing but order for us to exist at all. Things are what they are simply because of that. That is no evidence of conscious planning, or design. I like B. C. Johnsonıs comment that a theist might as well argue that everybody-whether tall or short-has legs precisely long enough to reach the ground.î4 Now we arrive at the last argument, the Analogical argument Paley popularized. To counteract an analogy, we only need a counterexample analogy. Imagine we go to another planet. Assume that there really are non-human intelligent inhabitants on this planet, but that we cannot see them. Now, can we learn of their presence just by examining the objects we find? Let us suppose that the inhabitants had constructed complicated mechanical things like watches and guns. We would probably conclude that these things were made by intelligent beings. The key here is that, we donıt know of watches and guns that occur naturally in nature. If however the beings only made things to resemble dogs and plants, we would not reach the conclusion of intelligent life, because we have seen plants, dogs, and other living things occur naturally in nature before. Living things, like dogs and plants, and the mechanical things, watches and guns, both have accurate adjustment of parts that produce some useful or purposeful effect. So this cannot be the basis for recognizing things as designed. The only difference is that guns and watches do not resemble living things like dogs and plants that are found in nature. To look at natural things in the universe and say that they were designed totally takes the word designed out of any meaningful context as the example demonstrates. We can elaborate on the point made above about the Law of Identity with another analogy. Let us consider a gun that has been constructed so that it shoots straight, while another gun was constructed which had such faulty parts, it exploded in the userıs hands. There is no more or less interaction of parts to produce the first case than the other. Yet the result in the first case was intended, while the result in the second was not. We cannot tell that a group of parts interacting to produce a certain result have been so constructed to intentionally produce it merely because the parts work together. We can say then that any result, planned or unplanned, is what it is only because of the causes, which interact to produce it. Furthermore, the parts of anything always interact to produce the result they do produce, whether or not that result was intended or not. Now, what if the theist were to say Okay, but what you fail to see is that the interaction of parts of objects in the universe produce the proper result, not just any result. That will be our real indication of whether or not the result was intended. You could ask him "What is the proper result" and he might reply "The proper result is the intended result."So he would be saying that the cooperation of parts to produce an intended result in fact proves that the result was intended. This, of course, is true! Now you can shake your theist friendıs hand for the remarkable job he has done. But before you get too worked up about your wonderful new proof for the existence of God, ask the theist "Wasnıt the question about whether or not the result of the cooperation of parts was intended to begin with? "For you have just been led in a circle. We conclude that the arguments discussed in this paper are very flawed and have consequences that should be taken seriously by anyone who wants to use them. References 1. HYPERLINK http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/alex_matulich/why_i_believe/3_apndx.html http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/alex_matulich/why_i_believe/3_apndx.html , everything on the page was used. 2. Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufmann, Philosophic Classics: From Plato to Derrida, 2000, 3rd edition, Prentice Hall, p. 341 3. George Smith, Atheism: The Case Against God, 1974, Nash Publishing, pp. 262-263, pp. 260-261 4. B. C. Johnson, The Atheist Debater's Handbook, 1981, Prometheus Books, p. 41 ----------- glk analysis of this paper. Languages have built in philosophies and assumptions, which can guide the type of ideas thought and offered. The self-organizing processes of the universe involve the attractive and repulsive forces of the universe, Atoms, molecules and systems of molecules can be seen to self organize. The definition of the word design involves the idea of intelligent construction for FUTURE use. This involves knowledge of the future. Physical processes are only affected by past events. A person who was generally ignorant of the world , upon finding a watch, would not know it was different from other natural objects. Since watches differ significantly from other natural objects, as seen by an experienced observer, the watch would be detected as deviating from the pattern of the rest of nature. Natural processes can easily generate complexity not easily analyzed by man with present finite analytical powers. It takes supercomputers to analyze the folding of proteins. There is no general way to analyze the future motion of a group of bodies in orbit. Step by step application of numeric integration is used. A relatively simple material like water takes a BIG book to list just the major characteristics. Anything in the real world is complex beyond all human analysis, if ALL characteristics are considered. A system of mutation and selection can generate what is called information as each event of death or survival/reproduction can be called a one or zero in a description of the system. More such events generate additional information. Complexity needs a readout system to be called information. To the ancients, there was no natural boundary between natural and supernatural. Rainbows were once called supernatural events by Hebrews, sent by God as a sign. Does a complex god need a more complex designer, gods all the way up.