mm-1939 existance of some function b(a) which does yield a number such that L(a,b(a))=L(b(a),b(a)). and of course this function does exist for all countable lists L since it is sufficient to assume this function proof that is... just the proof traversed in the opposite direction. your AXIOM is just what you assumed for your definition [2]. actually you even assumed that that L(b,b)+1 (mod 9) would be digit-changing! other great idea to use some (mod base-1)! however, now that you did expand your whole view on this proof, I somehow lost the connection to what you said earlier: that it would be a miscomprehension of usage of 2 independant infinite variables. what did you mean by that? which of those variables are infinite and independant? Sorry if I ask you to re-tell something you already mentioned multiple times, I'm just curious, and this newsgroup really is much too big to perform any serious search... -- Better send the eMails to netscape.net, as to evade useless burthening of my provider's /dev/null... P ehm, I think you mean ...mod 9. after all, I just showed that changing every 9 to a 0 is a bad thing for real numbers larger than 1... of course, that's why I said when viewed as since Cantor's diagonalization proof does imply that some algorithm does exist and does describe how it could look like. Did I again make some mistake with my wording? -- Better send the eMails to netscape.net, as to evade useless burthening of my provider's /dev/null... P at 05:45 PM, piotr5@unet.univie.ac.at (Piotr Sawuk) said: No. I meant f(d) = d+2 mod 10. No. The problem is deeper than your wording. -- Unsolicited bulk E-mail subject to legal action. I reserve the right to publicly post or ridicule any abusive E-mail. Reply to domain Patriot dot net user shmuel+news to contact me. Do not but in set-theory. I already told you that there dense is defined through a structure-preserving bijection between the set and some subset of the set it is supposed to be dense in, and through the order this subset does have relatively to the whole. there exists a set X such that R is dense in X, X has higher cardinality than R, and there exist at least a function which takes only elements of R and produces elements of XR. if this claim is true, then of course inside of the topology of X, R would not be connected. I would wish to, but first I need to understand the construction of R based on Q, and create above X in the same manner. Dedekind-cuts are not helpful at all in this endeavour, neither are Cauchy-sequences. the idea is to increase the turing-degree of Cauchy-filters and hope for Goedel's incompleteness-theorem to proof that the resulting construction does yield something which can not be described by any cauchy-filter based on rational numbers... as you know, there exista a partial function which takes as input an infinite sequence (of rational numbers) and does return a real number iff that sequence does converge. I could generalize that notion and define number as the output of a partial function which does take some collection of numbers as input, and which does fulfill some density-criteria which I still need to figure out. -- Better send the eMails to netscape.net, as to evade useless burthening of my provider's /dev/null... P at 05:44 PM, piotr5@unet.univie.ac.at (Piotr Sawuk) said: No. That's neither standard nor a definition. ITYM a topological space X and an imbedding of R in X with those properties. It's trivial to construct, but referring to that as reals are not continuous. seems rather bizarre. There is no of course; it's a non sequitor. R remains connected. If you can't prove it, then why make the claim? Why would that be either useful or relevant? -- Unsolicited bulk E-mail subject to legal action. I reserve the right to publicly post or ridicule any abusive E-mail. Reply to domain Patriot dot net user shmuel+news to contact me. Do not as always you are right, I wasn't aware that this was actually the definition. however, this is the definition of equinumerous in ZF while I somehow doubt that would have been the thing Ross had in mind when claiming that all infinite sets are equal. as usual, just because something is non-equinumerous in ZF doesn't mean that there exists no theory T with T|-(ZF-infinity) and T|-all infinite sets are the same with 2 sets are the same iff some invertible mapping does exist (and of course this theory would need to have its own notion of infinite and maybe even mapping would be defined differently)... -- Better send the eMails to netscape.net, as to evade useless burthening of my provider's /dev/null... P I think the same definitions of infinite set and mapping could apply. (ZF - Infinity + No set is infinite) would be a perfectly good example of such a theory. I think Ross mentioned a theory including ZF without regularity. Such a theory would need a redefinition of ordered pair. The standard one uses regularity to prove that {{a},{a,b}} = {{c},{c,d}} iff a=c and b=d. Something else would need to be found. - Tim Such Maybe you could take a leaf from Peter Aczel's book where I believe his theory, or rather the anti-foundational aspect often associated with him, has no foundation and an anti-foundation axiom, where that theorem that {{a,b}, a} = {{c, d}, d} is true if and only if a=c and b=d. If it resolves to a tautology, it does. Maybe Holmes, et al.'s NFU is called New Foundations with an Ur-element for a reason. It's called New Foundations with Ur-elements, not New Foundations with a Universe, unfortunately. The ur-element is the ding-an-sich and Hegelian Being and Nothing. It's the ur-element, it's universal and void, it's the root contradiction in acknowledgment. It's the ur-element, it's any set, one and many, the ur-element is very flexible. All the paradoxes are assigned to the ur-element, so it's the only counterintuitive thing, thus being intuitive in that way as it laughs at us sarcastically because it's only honest and tautologous. Whatever you take from it for truth it's happy to lie consistently, because it's opposite is another truth. It's quite serious. Those are basically meaningless statements, true dada, yet instead beautiful, or rather, art. I'm not a Randian objectivist. I think you are too, not being a hive-mind, it's a human condition. Actually purposefully constructing surrealism is a matter of definition, I suppose. It's similar to the opposite of the notion that a theorem inconsistent with others, and thus a logical axiom, leads to being able to prove anything, instead tautology as the only truth, disregarding the ubiquitous ur-element, or existence, concretizes only truths, and one plus one equals two. That's basically a philosophy. The idea of interest is that it's a mathematical logic. Is that not sublimely arrogant? Ross -- No, pun intended. nuh un. ground hogs. Rewrite that please, and make sure your sentences are coherent. You also might want to entertain the querulous masses by putting your points in plain-speak, or can the this topic only be reached in the way you present it? JJ way In some notion of contemplating paradox and truth, in a sense compatible with mathematical logic, it seems basically unobservable directly, instead the implications of a logic that refers to itself are rigorously defined in terms that necessarily suffer from some root unobservable in casting light upon the ability to consistently address inconsistency. So in saying that the truth lies, that is a reference to, for example, what is called the Liar paradox. Paradox may be the apeiron, where that is a Greek word meaning indefinite or unbounded, and for the Pythagoreans unnatural and false, anathema to structure, that I learned from Rucker's _Infinity and the Mind_ , where it was used to describe the actual infinite and irrational numbers by Pythagoreans, but it is as well trust in basic assumptions that those observable things do exist, that they are addressed. Where there is no right or wrong answer, the idea is to rationalize that unilemma so that there is, or that existence or existenz a la Derrida leads to there being only one acceptible set of truths. On researching the apeiron it appears to be part of Anaximander, a sixth century BCE philosopher's, consideration of the ur-element to which the excluded middle does not apply, but from which through some process leads to the opposites that form the elements of ancient theories of natural physics. ... [Anaximander] did not just utter apodictic statements, but also tried to give arguments. This is what makes him the first philosopher. is from http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/anaximan.htm, the first link returned by Google from searching for Anaximander I never associated apeiron with paradox before, instead with infinite, but it appears to match similar characteristics of the unobservable consequences of any self-referential statement, in a similar way as to the modernized notion of Kant's Ding-an-Sich or Hegel's being and nothing, and other notions of the conflation of the universe and void. So basically the notion of the lying, laughing paradox is that as the ur-element from it is extracted truth, and that it's acceptible to consider that truth, but if all the one bits were changed to off bits in the infinite precision binary digital computer, that it would still function the same way, that the anti-computer is the computer. There's a lot of room to attempt to mold these fleeting glimpses of truth, or perhaps lack thereof or delusion, into more coherent rationalizations to consider anything at all true in this or these universes of logical discourse, which leads to philosophers over millenia emitting libraries. Compared to that anybody is just a dabbler. Plainness is in the eye of the beholder. What I hope to do is to interface these notions of the ur-element, or existence, but not necessarily in existential way, to the mathematical logic of a set theory, to help in the resolution of the self-referential paradox of set theory, towards for all logical intents and purposes consistency, completeness, and concreteness in a theory of mathematical logic conducive to establishing the truth value of mathematical statements. In reference to the previous post, there should be {{a,b},a} = {{c,d},c}. I carefully analyze the seeming error. It is only true when a=b=c=d, or a=d and b=c, that {{a,b},a} = {{c,d},d}, where it is not true if a=b and c=d and a=/=c. Sartre, nihilist?: Sartre, cook? Even philosophers have to dine sometime. In a way, that's about extending the dining philosophers Gedanken to infinitely many. Frank Harary passed away last month. Harary is a famous graph theoretician. Harary's graphs are undirected, Claude Berge's, directed. Both produced excellent tomes, _Graph Theory_ and _Graphs and Hypergraphs_ are accessible, widely used textbooks. Those North-Holland imprints are really good. I've been trying to get an intuitive grasp of graph theory for computer algorithms, where graphs and other data structures are all represented in memory as a flat, one-dimensional sequence. In terms of sets dense in the reals it's interesting to consider a line from Friedman's discussion of requirements for large cardinals: Even for countable sets of rationals, we know that, in various appropriate senses, we must use transfinite induction of arbitrary countable well ordered lengths. - Dr. Friedman, Undecidable Theorems, Apr. 15, Infinite sets are equivalent. Ross F. again I forgot to explicitely write down the dependencies: 1) for-all r1 and r2 non-equal in R there exists q in Q such that either r1 <_R q <_R r2 or r2 <_R q <_R r1 with <_R being transitive and anti-reflexive. 2) for-all r1 and r2 in R there exists q in Q such that from r1 <_R r2 follows that r1 <_R q <_R r2, again with <_R being transitive and anti-reflexive. the difference is that 1) does enforce anti-symetry, linearity and extensionality from <_Q (since pred_(<_R)(x) non-equal pred_(<_R)(y) for x