INGERSOLL, A BIOGRAPHICAL APPRECIATION  CHAPTER 14.  WAS HE 'A MERE ICONOCLAST'? (concluded)  Did He Endeavor To Destroy the Hope of Immortality?  In dealing with the specific charges of iconoclasm that have been so insistently pressed by the theological indicters of Ingersoll, there yet remain to be considered his views of at least one other subject, -- the immortality of the soul. Holding as they do so prominent and so essential a place in his life-work, -- running like threads of gold through the very warp and woof of his philosophy, -- their presentation is not merely desirable: it constitutes a task which no conscientious reviewer could avoid.  It is asserted by Ingersoll's critics, that his monistic and agnostic teachings, in general, and his rejection of supernatural purpose and design and the bodily resurrection and ascension of Christ, in particular, utterly destroy the hope of immortality, leaving mankind without the shadow of a consolation that the unspeakable wrongs of this life will be righted in another.  Now, clearly to understand Ingersoll's views concerning the immortality of the soul, that is, concerning the mind after the death of the body, it is first absolutely necessary to understand his views concerning the mind before the death of the body. What were they?  Reiterating so much only of his philosophy as is essential to a comprehensive presentation of the views in question, and avoiding the "double words" of the metaphysician and the psychologist, I may state that Ingersoll believed in what is called the natural; that the universe is the uncreated and indestructible, the infinite and eternal, all. Without pretending either to define or to distinguish them, he believed that this all consists of what are called substance and force. He did not believe that there is any power, force, or essence behind the universe, because, even to think of such power, force, or essence, he would have been necessitated to think of some form or phase of substance or force, that is, of some part or phase of the universe. In other words, he would have been necessitated to think of something as existing behind itself. This being impossible, the supernatural was excluded from his belief. Incapable of conceiving of anything but the natural, he believed that every phenomenon is a natural phenomenon. Though the original development of organic life from inorganic substance and force was to him an insoluble problem, he believed that, from the monera or some even more simple protoplasmic mass, through countless ages, had evolved by a series of purely natural, interrelated chemical, physical, and psychological processes. He held that by no conceivable possibility could the human organism have become different from what it is. Confident that there was no more trustworthy informant concerning that organism, he accepted the conclusions of the representative biological and anthropological scientists of his day. He believed, for example, that, without what are termed the voluntary muscles, it would be absolutely impossible for an individual voluntarily to exert force; that, were it not for the heart and the rest of the circulatory mechanism, it would be impossible either to supply with food the several tissues of the  body or to remove from them the various deleterious products of waste; that, in the absence of certain nerve-tissues, there would be no sensation. He was satisfied as to the inevitable and invariable functional integrity of these structures. He believed, that, between the highly specialized and widely differentiated tissues or organs just mentioned, there is no vicarious action; that voluntary motion is invariably effected through the muscles; circulation, through the heart; sensation, through the nerves. He was convinced that the quality and the degree of functional activity in the organs concerned depend absolutely and inevitably upon their own physiological condition, plus the conditions of their environment. In short, he believed that the organs of motion, circulation, and sensation naturally developed, under natural conditions, and are natural organs, acting in a natural way.  Did he believe to the contrary concerning any other organ -- concerning the brain? In my judgment, there is no better way of initiating a reply to this question than by asking another -- than by asking simply this: Could he?  To him, the brain was either natural or supernatural: it could not be both. It was either a purely natural organ, manifesting the purely natural phenomena called mind, or it was a purely supernatural organ, manifesting the purely supernatural phenomena called mind. Which of these would he declare it to be? Holding, as already indicated, that every other organ is purely natural, could he declare that the brain, chemically the most complex, and anatomically and physiologically the most wonderful, of all, is purely supernatural, manifesting purely supernatural phenomena?  He knew that the source and origin of thought had been removed by modern science from the maze of metaphysics to the domain of the physical, the natural. He knew, that, superseding the theories of such dualistic thinkers as Plato and Descartes, according to the last of whom the ego sat an inexorable autocrat on its throne in the pineal gland, we have a physicochemical mechanism within whose wondrous substance is an epitome of all the past and a hint of all the future -- an organ constantly reacting to external stimuli, like all other organs, and subject to the same immutable forces or conditions -- an organ whose function is the production and manifestation of thought. And he knew, that, were there no such organ, there would be no thought, -- just as he knew, that, were there no muscles, heart, nor nerves, there would be no motion, circulation, nor sensation. He knew, that, if this were not the case, -- if that marvelous organ called the brain were merely a sort of play-ground for some "absolute" immaterial essence, -- mental vigor would not increase directly (pari passu) with physiological vigor, as revealed by the scalpel and the microscope, nor wane like a fading flower with the progress of disease. He saw, that, if the brain be not the real and only source of mental phenomena, there is no reason why, when a part or all of its essential cells and fibers are destroyed by accident, experiment, disease, or age, the individual concerned should not continue to think with as much facility as he did before, -- to think with some other organ, -- with the spleen, for example.  Of course, Ingersoll was well aware that so-called scientists had produced many volumes to show, that, although a certain more or less definite connection between the mind and the brain must be admitted, there is no absolutely necessary and inevitable relation between the physicochemical constitution of that organ and either the quality or the quantity of the phenomena it manifests. He was perfectly familiar with such arguments, all of which amount to no more than this, namely, that the relation between brain and mind is, at best, only a parallel relation, that is, the relation between the natural and the supernatural! So the assertions of the dualist made upon him no impression, save that they were, for the most part, untrue: --  "Thought is a form of force. We walk with the same force with which we think. Man is an organism, that changes several forms of force into thought-force. Man is a machine into which we put what we call food, and produce what we call thought. Think of that wonderful chemistry by which bread was changed into the divine tragedy of Hamlet!"  It must not be inferred, however, that Ingersoll regarded mind and consciousness as solved problems; -- that he was chargeable with the crudity usually attributed to materialistic psychology. For he was not a pure materialist. Nor was he a pure "energist": rather was he what I venture to term an agnostic monist. He said:  "I believe there is such a thing as matter. I believe there is a something called force. The difference between force and matter I do not know. So there is a something called consciousness. Whether we call consciousness an entity or not makes no difference as to what it really is. There is something that hears, sees and feels, a something that takes cognizance of what happens in what we call the outward world. No matter whether we call this something matter or spirit, it is something that we do not know, to say least of it, all about. We cannot understand what matter is. It defies us, and defies definitions. So, with what we call spirit, we are in utter ignorance of what it is. We have some little conception of what we mean by it, and of what others mean, but as to what it really is no one knows. It makes no difference whether we call ourselves Materialists or Spiritualists, we believe in all there is, no matter what you call it. If we call it all matter, then we believe that matter can think and hope and dream. If we call it all spirit, then we believe that spirit has force, that it offers a resistance; in other words, that it is in one of its aspects, what we call matter. I cannot believe that everything can be accounted for by motion or by what we call force, because there is something that recognizes force. There is something that compares, that thinks, that remembers; there is something that suffers and enjoys; there is something that each one calls himself or herself, that is inexplicable to himself or herself, and it makes no difference whether we call this something mind or soul, effect or entity, it still eludes us, and all the world we have coined for the purpose of expressing our knowledge of this something, after all, expresses only our desire to know, and our efforts to ascertain."  Believing, then, that mind, in some unknown way, is, like physiological motion, circulation, and sensation, a function or  manifestation of the organ with which it is related, could Ingersoll logically accept the popular view, that it shares at death a different fate than they? Since to reply in the negative would be entirely gratuitous, let us pass, at once, to the paramount question, Did he deny that it shares a different fate? And let us have the answer in the Great Agnostic's own words: --  "I have said a thousand times, and say again, that we do not know, we cannot say, whether death is a wall or a door -- the beginning, or the end, of a day -- the spreading of pinions to soar, or the folding forever of wings -- the rise or set of a sin, or an endless life, that brings rapture and love to every one."  In a letter to Mr. David S. Geer, president of the Oakland Literary Club, Chicago, the same conviction is reiterated, and its foundation concisely stated. Mr. Geer had addressed to Dr. E. B. Foote, Sr., of New York, a birthday greeting that contained, among other things, a positive assurance of immortality: --  "117 East Twenty-first Street, "Gramercy Park, April 24, '99  "My Dear Mr. Geer:  "What you said to Dr. Foote is beautiful and for all I know it may be all true. Still, I have no evidence that human beings are immortal. Neither have I any evidence that 'there is any wise and beneficent power back of all creation.' In fact, I have no evidence of creation. I believe that all matter and all force have existed from, and will exist, to eternity. There is to me no evidence of the existence of any power superior to Nature. In my opinion the supernatural does not exist. Still, we can wish in spite of, or against, evidence, and we can hope without it.  "Yours always,  "R.G. Ingersoll."  And elsewhere: --  "* * * it is no more wonderful that we should live again than that we do live. Sometimes I have thought it not quite so wonderful for the reason that we have a start. But upon that subject I have not the slightest information. Whether man lives again or not I cannot pretend to say. * * *  "My opinion of immortality is this:  "First. -- I live, and that of itself is infinitely wonderful. Second. -- There was a time when I was not, and after I was not, I was. Third. -- Now that I am, I may be again; and it is no more wonderful that I may be again, if I have been, than that I am, having once been nothing."  "It is natural to shun death, natural to desire eternal life. With all my heart I hope for everlasting life and joy * * * ."  As indicated in the beginning of this chapter. it has often been asserted by his critics, that the destruction of the Bible and the Christian religion, through the universal acceptance of Ingersoll's teachings, would blot out of the human heart the hope of immorality. Passing over the fact that, as has just been shown, Ingersoll, far from denying the possibility of a future life, himself ardently hoped for it, it must be noted that the assertion in question (doubtless unwittingly, but nevertheless unavoidably) implies, that, had it not been for that book and that religion, there would now be no such hope. Ingersoll, as would be expected, clearly perceived this unfortunate corollary of his adversaries; and we accordingly find him dwelling with insistence upon the fact that the hope of immortality existed, not only thousands of years before Christ is supposed to have been born, but thousands of years before the time of Moses; that, for many thousands of years, the very cross itself has been a symbol of the life to come; that it has been found carved in stone above the graves of a people who lived and loved and hoped and dreamed beneath the same "sunny skies" long before either the Romans or the Etruscans -- carved in the walls of the ruined temples of Central America -- carved upon Babylonian cylinders. He further declares, with undoubted consternation to many, that, although the doctrine of a future life was taught in Egypt, India, and China thousands of years before either Christ or Moses is supposed to have been born, and is still taught there, it is not taught in the Old Testament. He insists that, as a matter of fact, while the Old Testament tells us how man lost immortality through Jehovah's preventing Adam from eating of the tree of life, there came from the top of Sinai no hope of a hereafter; that no one in the Old Testament "stands by the dead and says, 'We shall meet again.' "And, finally, he declares that, notwithstanding the "one little passage in Job which commentators have endeavored to twist into a hope of immortality," the Old Testament does not contain, "from the first mistake in Genesis to the last curse in Malachi," a burial service, nor even a single word about another world. Indeed, he goes even further when he asserts, that, "if we take the Old Testament for authority, man is not immortal."  To present just here, in what might seem to be natural and logical sequence, Ingersoll's views as to whether the doctrine of immortality is taught in the New Testament, and if so, the kind of immortality there contemplated, would be premature, if not altogether irrelevant. The fact, as pointed out by him, that the hope of another life, although not recorded in the Old Testament, was held among many nations of antiquity, thousands of years before either Christ or Moses is supposed to have been born, and is now held in heathen and other non-Christian countries, is a sufficient refutation of the assertion, that, since in the absence of the Bible and of Christianity there would have been, and would be, no such hope, universal unbelief in them as divine institutions, in accordance with his teachings, would destroy it. And this refutation is at the same time a demonstration, -- a demonstration of the fact, that, contrary to the apparent understanding of his Christian critics, the hope of immortality is something with which neither the Bible nor Christianity necessarily has anything whatever to do. That hope is not dependent upon either. As a matter of fact, the relation is precisely the other way. Take from the New Testament and Christianity their teachings of immortality, and the Bible and Christianity would perish; but destroy every copy of the Bible, and erase from the tablet of memory the last trace of Christian thought, and the hope of immortality would still 'spring eternal in the human breast.' And what is true of the Bible and Christianity in this regard is true of every other so-called sacred book and supernatural religion.  The weakness -- the falsity -- of the criticisms of Ingersoll's views of immortality lies in their failure to distinguish between terms. His critics confound hope with belief, and regard belief as equivalent to realization, or as a force capable of bringing about realization. It is therefore natural that they should place the utmost importance in belief, which, by a strangely erroneous consistency, they consider to be a mere puppet of caprice, -- a result of the so called will. They seem to think that even feigned belief is better than none; and so, ignoring the natural operations of the mind, they say to the rationalist: "The doctrines of Ingersoll may be good enough to live by, but they are poor doctrines to die by. Whatever your doubts, if you desire immortality you would better believe and be 'on the safe side.' "As though a chemist should say to a navigator who occupied an agnostic attitude toward the theories of chemistry: "If on your next voyage you wish the hydrogen and the oxygen which form the sea-water to remain united as such, not to spurn each other, and, returning to dissociate gases, allow your ship to fall to the ground, you would better believe in chemical affinity."  To such reasoning, -- to the sophistical theological assertion that belief can change the fact, -- the Great Agnostic, never doubting the uniformity of nature, replied: --  "If we are immortal it is a fact in nature, and we are not indebted to priests for it, nor to bibles for it, and it cannot be destroyed by unbelief."  And again: --  "Is man Immortal?  "I do not know.  "One thing I do know, and that is, that neither hope, nor fear, belief, nor denial, can change the fact. It is as it is, and it will be as it must be."  A question of profound interest here presents itself. As indicated in the preceding pages, it was apparent to Ingersoll, although he was far from either affirming or denying, that mind, like every other organic function, ceases at the death of the organ in which it is manifest. He was not aware that any mind had survived the death of the brain. Of one fact he was aware, however -- that in the idea of immortality there is something fundamentally human -- that, in every age, it had been almost universal to mankind. How did he account for this? Did he conceive it to be a gift from the supernatural? I have shown that he held it to be the idea was an a priori one, as Kant believed some ideas to be? To hold that an idea is a priori is merely one way of saying that it is supernatural. Besides, Ingersoll specifically declared that all of man's ideas are a posteriori; that they were born of experience here in this world. How, then, did he account for the idea of another life?  Like all other individuals of genius, Ingersoll possessed a profound knowledge of human nature. With him, despite his stern and sometimes implacable logic, two factors entered into all mental operations, -- heart and brain. He declared that whoever came to a conclusion without consulting his heart would make a mistake. And it was because he followed his own advice -- it was because "his brain took counsel of his heart" -- that his conclusions were almost never wrong. He knew that those who have suffered most have thought most; that those who have lain in the lowest dungeons of despair and gloom have soared to the loftiest, sunniest, most ecstatic heights. In endeavoring, therefore, to account for that loftiest of ideas, he consulted not only reason but feeling. Finding that the brain could give no satisfactory explanation, he looked in the heart; and he found that human affection, the foundation of nearly everything else of value, is no less the foundation here. He said: --  "The idea of immortality, that like a sea ebbed and flowed in the human heart, with its countless waves of hope and fear beating against the shores and rocks of time and fate, was not born of any book, nor of any creed, nor of any religion. It was born of human affection, and it will continue to ebb and flow beneath the mists and clouds of doubt and darkness as long as love kisses the lips of death. It is the rainbow -- Hope, shinning upon the tears of grief."  Were it possible to doubt that this exquisite paragraph contains the very kernel of the Great Agnostic's convictions on the subject concerned; were it possible to doubt that it came ingenuously, spontaneously, from his heart and brain together, -- not from his brain alone, as an artful attack upon theology, -- our questioning would be instantly silenced by the last clause of the following passage, which was delivered many years later at the bier of a brother (as indicated in Chapter 5), and which, I may remark in passing, has been frequently misrepresented and misunderstood. I have italicized the particular clause: -- END****************************************************************************